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Abstract: 
Much has been said about the institutional determinants of transitional justice (TJ), yet 
we still know little about the determinants of citizens' attitudes towards restorative 
policies aimed at addressing human rights violations of the past. This paper draws on an 
original survey of a representative sample of Spanish citizens conducted in 2008. One 
year earlier, the Spanish socialist government had approved the so-called "Law of 
Historical Memory", aimed at providing restitution for victims of the Spanish Civil War 
(1936-1939) and the Francoist dictatorship (1939-1975). We analyze individual-level 
attitudes towards a set of TJ policies (i.e. truth commissions, trials, and symbolic 
reparations) in a comprehensive overview of the field. We study the effect of different 
sets of variables: individual socio-demographic and ideological factors, family and 
socialization variables, and context-related factors. Individual ideology, family 
victimization during the dictatorship and regional context appear as highly relevant in 
explaining individual attitudes towards TJ policies.  
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1. Introduction 
The expression “transitional justice” (hereafter, TJ) refers to a set of procedures 
that are predominantly adopted during democratization periods –but also sometimes 
when democracy has been consolidated (Aguilar, 2008a; Thoms et al., 2008)– in order 
to deal with atrocities committed by the former regime or during a violent conflict. TJ 
procedures fall into three broad categories: (1) justice measures aimed at punishing 
former perpetrators for human rights violations or depriving them of illegitimate 
privileges; (2) policies aimed at providing material and/or symbolic reparation for 
victims; and (3) truth revelation procedures.1  
The study of TJ policies is a burgeoning field of social research, but there are 
still a number of lacunae to be filled. For example, while the vast majority of the 
literature on TJ has focused on explaining the institutional determinants of these 
policies or on the normative discussion about their desirability,2 there has been little 
research on public opinion regarding TJ. In some existing works, the opinion of citizens 
has been inferred from the pressures exerted by social organizations (Skaar, 1999). This 
is problematic, because it cannot be assumed that there is a direct relationship between 
the demands promoted by organizations or pressure groups and the general preferences 
of the citizenry.3 Moreover, many of the existing scholarly contributions on bottom-up 
demands for TJ draw on ethnographic research including interviews and/or 
observational participation (Theidon, 2006; Ferreira, 1999), interviews with specific 
focus groups (Grodsky, 2008; Martín Beristain, 2008; Strover and Weinstein, 2004; 
ICTJ, 2004), or interviews with particular subgroups of the overall population, e.g. 
victims (Espinoza Cuevas, et al. 2003; ICTJ, 2008) or pressure groups (Backer 2003).  
In short, barring very few exceptions, scholars have not relied on systematic 
generalizable evidence of individual attitudes towards TJ policies.4 In this paper, we 
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make a two-fold empirical contribution to this literature: first, we explore data from a 
hitherto unexploited representative survey of the Spanish population, which we 
designed and was implemented by the Spanish Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas 
(hereafter, CIS) in April 2008; second, this survey is a monographic study, which 
provides us with detailed information on different TJ measures (i.e. commissions, trials 
and symbolic reparations), as well as on a number of independent and control variables. 
This type of fine-grained data is a valuable resource from which we gain empirical 
leverage. 
At the theoretical level, this paper contributes to a better understanding of TJ by 
presenting a set of hypotheses on the determinants of individual-level attitudes to these 
policies, which are grounded in TJ literature and also in the literature on victimization 
and intergenerational transmission of identities. The latter is particularly relevant for 
understanding the Spanish case, where the most traumatic and violent events are not 
recent (the Civil War ended 70 years ago, the dictatorship more than 30 years ago), and 
therefore a vast majority of the population did not experience the violations at first 
hand. Even though we focus on the Spanish case, we intend to generate implications for 
other transitional/post-transitional countries that share some basic characteristics with 
Spain.  
This paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we introduce the Spanish case 
and outline its importance for the study of transitional and post-transitional justice; in 
section 3, we present the theoretical framework and hypotheses, which we empirically 
test in section 4. To conclude, we discuss our findings and their implications for other 
cases.  
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2. Transitional Justice in Spain 
The Spanish case is particularly appropriate for TJ research: the severe brutality 
and prolonged violations perpetrated by the Franco regime against those on the losing 
side in the Civil War (1936–1939), and against all those who subsequently refused to 
comply with its dictates (1939–1975), are well-known. Throughout the civil conflict, 
tens of thousands of people on both sides lost their lives as a result of both legal and 
extrajudicial executions.5 However, political violence continued during the early years 
of the postwar period; estimations suggest that the Franco regime executed 
approximately 50,000 people, that the number of prisoners in concentration camps 
amounted to 300,000, and that hundreds of thousands were forced into exile. 
Throughout Franco’s entire rule, tens of thousands of people who had been expelled 
from their jobs after the war as a result of their ideological leanings were systematically 
denied reinstatement. The regime also refused to offer pensions or any compensation 
whatsoever not only to war-disabled veterans and civilians, but also to the widows and 
orphans of defeated combatants. Likewise, political parties, trade unions and private 
individuals had their assets seized simply for having sympathized with the Second 
Republic (1931–1936); meanwhile, those who had supported the victors enjoyed 
numerous perks and privileges. 
After Franco’s death, the presence of the traumatic memory of the Civil War and 
the obsessive desire to avoid its repetition encouraged the main political actors and the 
majority of Spanish citizens to look to the future by putting aside the thorniest aspects 
of the past. It was firmly believed that this was the only way to ensure a peaceful 
transition to democracy (Aguilar, 2002, 2008b). As in other cases –Chile, Uruguay and 
Hungary–, political elites reached a tacit agreement to leave the dictatorial past out of 
the political debate. In this context, the Parliament enacted the Amnesty Law of 15 
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October 1977, whose purpose was to free political prisoners and to shield the dictatorial 
past from any judicial proceedings. 
Among the myriad possible TJ policies that could have been adopted during the 
transition to democracy, only material reparation measures targeting Civil War losers 
were approved. These policies were limited and fragmented. TJ measures such as 
official condemnation of the dictatorship, symbolic measures aimed at the reparation of 
all the victims of the dictatorship, the creation of a truth commission, or the quashing of 
Francoist trials -not to mention bringing perpetrators of human rights violations to trial- 
were never implemented. Nevertheless, when most Spaniards thought that the most 
painful episodes of their history had been buried once and for all, the past erupted again: 
in 2000 a private association devoted to the task of locating and exhuming mass graves 
dating from the Civil War (called the Asociación para la Recuperación de la Memoria 
Histórica) triggered a social and political debate about the shortcomings of previous TJ 
policies.6  
In this context, the conservative social and State-wide political forces (e.g. the 
Partido Popular) positioned themselves against “digging into the past”. In contrast, the 
most progressive political parties and social associations (e.g. the Partido Socialista 
Obrero Español and the political federation led by the former Communists, Izquierda 
Unida) were in favor of them. The most important quantitative and qualitative leap 
forward in relation to TJ legislation took place during the 2004-2008 legislative term, 
especially with the passing of “Law 52/2007, of 26th December,” which “recognizes and 
broadens the rights and establishes measures in favor of those who suffered persecution 
or violence during the Civil War and the dictatorship”.7   
Our survey was conducted in the immediate aftermath of the heated debate that 
accompanied the passing of this law. In this context, Spaniards had diverging opinions 
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towards TJ measures; we wonder on what explains them. Firstly, one could argue that 
individual characteristics such as ideology influenced opinions on the issue: leftist 
sympathizers and militants were probably more supportive of a law that was being 
promoted by a left-wing party. Secondly, personal experiences that proved relevant in 
explaining preferences towards TJ in other contexts8 could only partially explain these 
attitudes; most of the Spanish population in 2007 had not experienced the Civil War at 
first hand, while people under the age of 30 did not even have experience of the 
dictatorship. Thirdly, since reparation policies in the 2007 “Law of Historical Memory” 
did not focus on monetary compensations for victimized people, greed or self-interest 
were irrelevant in this context. Finally, regional factors could also have been important: 
people living in particular regions may have had different perspectives on TJ owing to 
their different collective histories during the Civil War and the dictatorship, and also 
because of their current ethnic identities.  
3. Theoretical Framework 
In this paper, we argue that attitudes to TJ are determined by a combination of 
individual, family and context-related (i.e. regional) factors. Over the following pages, 
we outline the theoretical significance of each of these factors, and the different 
mechanisms through which they are likely to have an impact on attitudes towards TJ.  
Individual Factors 
Individual characteristics are essential in explaining variation in political views; 
the list of relevant individual-level factors explaining variation in attitudes towards TJ is 
potentially endless. Therefore, we concentrate only on those we deem most relevant 
theoretically: 
The respondent’s age is an obvious factor in explaining differences in political 
views. With regard to TJ on past events, one would expect older people to be more 
  7
reluctant to support reparation policies because of their personal proximity to traumatic 
events. The mechanism driving this is fear, which might be operating more or less 
specifically: on the one hand, people may have a specific fear of reprisal from those 
who would be negatively affected by these policies (i.e. ex-victimizers);9 on the other 
hand, people may have a more general fear of a return of the conflict or the authoritarian 
regime (Nalepa 2007). While it could be argued that direct memories of traumatic 
events could also be stimulating a desire for reparations, we expect risk-aversion to 
prevail among those who witnessed the civil conflict or the ancien régime.10 
Furthermore, with regard to the specific fear of reprisal, we can expect it to have a 
differential impact on TJ preferences depending on contextual factors such as the size of 
the locality where the individual lives: in larger municipalities, anonymity is greater 
than in smaller towns; in smaller settings, politics is more personal, and people are more 
likely to feel that reparation policies may have specific (i.e. negative) consequences for 
their own safety. 
The way individuals evaluate TJ measures should be clearly determined by their 
ability to understand not only the past in general, but also key historical events. 
Education is probably the single most important individual characteristic accounting for 
differentials in the extent to which individuals are able to do so, yet it may not be the 
only one: interest in politics might also play a role in their ability to evaluate these 
policies. For obvious reasons, individuals may have different views about TJ depending 
on their self-placement on the ideological axis. The direction of the effect will depend 
on the country’s history, including the trajectory of its political parties.11 Finally, 
religiosity and/or ethnicity are other individual characteristics to be considered insofar 
as victimization affects religious and/or ethnic groups unevenly. 
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Socialization and Family Factors 
The traditional focus of sociologists on the impact of family views and values in 
the formation of individual perceptions about life is reasonably intuitive. The literature 
on intergenerational transmission of political views underwent rapid growth in the 
seventies when Styskal and Sullivan (1975: 516-7) concluded:  
“Parents - the most trusted and revered of individuals in a person's early 
years - are the single most important force in transmitting party 
identification […] that choice of party, the substantive meaning of the 
party for the individual and the individual's orientation toward issues are 
more the products of loyalties derived from parents early in one's life, 
when cognitive processes are relatively underdeveloped, than the result of 
reflective decisions about alternatives in the political arena.”  
 
Indeed, despite the popular belief that during adolescence children will turn away 
from their parents in search of alternative guidance for value orientation, most empirical 
research reveals a striking concordance between the worldviews of parents and those of 
their (adult) children (Acock and Bengtson, 1980; Beck and Jennings, 1991; Dalhouse 
and Frideres, 1996; Jennings and Niemi, 1974; 1981; Jennings, Stoker and Bowers, 
2009; Miller and Glass, 1989). Thus, individuals are expected to favor TJ policies to the 
extent that their parents do so. Moreover, we might argue that individuals will favor TJ 
policies if they adopt the condition of “victim” from their ancestors.  
Psychological effects of violence and other forms of victimization have been 
widely studied in the academic literature on conflict (e.g. the well-known “Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder” or PTSD). However, the specific effects of traumatic 
experiences on individuals’ identities and behavior have generally been overlooked 
(Balcells, 2007), partly due to a lack of appropriate data for conducting empirical 
analyses. Although the recent development of surveys and experiments in postwar 
settings has prompted the development of empirical studies tackling these issues, the 
evidence is still quite fragmented and refers mainly to the short-term effects of 
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traumatic events (e.g. Bellows and Miguel, 2008).  Neither do we find a much better 
state of the art in the study of individual experiences of dictatorships, and their 
subsequent preferences and opinions, both during and after democratization processes. 
This literature has usually focused on the role of political activists or highly committed 
individuals (Maravall, 1978; Ferreira, 1999), with only some recent developments 
concerning rank and file individuals (Wittenberg, 2006).  
Thus, the existing literature cannot provide an answer to the question of whether 
victimization generates long-term consequences on attitudes towards TJ measures. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that, given the positive impact of personal victimization 
on support for reparation policies on a short-term basis (Nalepa, 2007; Gibson, 2002, 
2004a, 2004b, 2007; Biro et al. 2004), victimizing experiences of family ancestors 
should also lead to favorable attitudes regarding reparation policies. The mechanism 
leading towards an intergenerational transmission of these attitudes should be the same 
as that which explains intergenerational transmission of political identities. In short, we 
can formulate the conjecture that victimization is a condition that is transmitted to 
descendants through socialization processes.  
Contextual Factors 
The literature has nevertheless found that the family is not the only socialization 
source for individuals: adult re-socialization experiences (both individual -partner, 
friends- and contextual) can erode the primary socialization effects of the parents. Thus, 
the broader context in which the individual lives, works and relates to other people can 
also have an influence on attitudes towards policies. Contextual factors can be varied 
and complex, as are the mechanisms through which they operate; a clear contextual 
variable, albeit not the only one, is the individual’s political community, e.g. the locality 
or the region.  Within the community, the individual interacts according to a particular 
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set of cultural repertoires and discourses, and there is peer-reinforcement of these 
discourses. Irrespective of individual and family factors, if the citizens of a particular 
region or locality perceive that they have been distinctively victimized, we may think 
that they will hold more favorable attitudes towards TJ policies than elsewhere.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 1 summarizes the combination of factors which, according to our 
framework, should have an impact on individual preferences for TJ, and which should 
explain variations in these preferences among individuals. While depicted as 
independently affecting preferences, these factors may also be intermingled: for 
instance, socialization within the family can be affected by contextual factors (i.e. 
socialization and transmission of victimization within families may vary across 
regions).  However, given the endless list of connections that could be drawn, and the 
impossibility of generating clear-cut observable implications for each of these 
interactions, we treat them as independent factors.12  
4. Empirical Test 
In this section we will verify the explanatory power of each of the factors indicated 
above by examining data from the aforementioned CIS survey, which sampled 2,936 
respondents throughout the country and is representative of the over-18 Spanish 
population.13 Conducted over a 10-day period through face-to-face interviews lasting 
around 30 minutes, this monographic survey on “historical memory” included 70 
questions about historical and political knowledge, political attitudes and behavior, and 
socio-demographic characteristics.  
Following a common practice in the literature, we operationalized support for 
three different types of TJ measures with different survey questions:  
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1) For attitudes to the creation of a truth commission to inquire into past abuses: 
“From your point of view, should an investigation commission (independent from the 
government) be created in order to clarify human rights violations that took place under 
Francoism?”14 
2) For attitudes towards trials to judge those responsible for past human rights 
violations: “Should the authorities that violated human rights under Francoism be 
brought to trial/judged?”15  
3) For attitudes towards symbolic reparations, we used responses 
(agree/disagree) to the following statement: “Symbols that pay tribute to Franco and 
Francoism should be withdrawn from public spaces.” 16 
To test our hypotheses, we include three subsets of independent and control 
variables in a set of step-wise binary and ordinal logistic regressions. We include a first 
set of independent variables measuring individual characteristics: (1) Age: we expect 
older respondents to be more reluctant to support TJ measures; we also expect to find 
some sort of interaction between age and the size of the respondent’s locality due to the 
anonymity provided by large localities.17 (2) Interest in politics:18 we expect exposure to 
the public debate concerning the “Law of Historical Memory” to promote clear-cut 
positions on the issue. We include this variable as a control.19 (3) Education:20 
education increases the individual’s sophistication and thus her ability to formulate her 
own views about past events. (4) Religiosity:21 the religious division was a significant 
one in the context of the Spanish Civil War and the dictatorship -on the one hand, 
members of the clergy were victims of leftist violence during the conflict; and on the 
other, the Catholic Church sided with Franco during the Civil War and the dictatorship. 
Thus, we expect religiosity to have a negative impact on support for TJ measures.22 (5) 
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Ideology:23  we expect a clear-cut negative effect of right-wing ideology on support for 
TJ policies.  
We include a second set of variables proxying family characteristics and 
socialization: (1) Family Identity during the Civil War:24 those whose family identified 
with the Nationalists during the Civil War should be more negative towards TJ policies, 
and vice-versa. (2) Family talked about politics:25 this variable is included to control for 
the extent to which politics being discussed at home may influence the intergenerational 
transmission of identities and victimization. (3) Father’s ideology: this variable captures 
the parents’ ideology: 26 we expect a negative impact of right-wing parent ideology on 
support for TJ. (4) Family/Individual Victimization: we take into account victimization 
both by the Francoist side in the Civil War and by the Francoist dictatorship.27  The two 
variables included in the regressions are: (4.a) Victimization during the Civil War: 
dummy with value 1 if the respondent argues that she or a member of her family was 
victimized by the Francoist side during the Civil War, and value 0 if not.28 (4.b) 
Victimization during the dictatorship: dummy with value 1 if the respondent argues that 
she or any member of the family was victimized by the Francoist dictatorship, and value 
0 if not.29 We expect people whose ancestors (or who themselves) have been victimized 
to be more supportive of TJ.30 Victimization experiences should also have a differential 
effect depending on the individual’s age: the older the person is, the more intensely she 
will feel the victimizing experience; we will test this with an interaction term in the 
regression models. 
A final set of variables is intended to measure contextual factors. As previously 
stated, we focus on the regional level. The Francoist dictatorship strongly repressed 
cultural and linguistic minorities within Spain; this led to a collective sense of 
victimization among these groups, which has persisted through time. Given that our 
  13
survey has representative sub-samples for the Basque Country and Catalonia31 -two 
territories with the most distinguishable ethnic identities and strongest sense of 
collective victimization in Spain- we can easily incorporate a regional dummy variable 
into our regressions. In this respect, we expect the (1) Basque Country and (2) Catalonia 
dummies to have a positive effect on support for all TJ measures.  
Figures 2-4 show the distribution of the responses in the different items 
constituting our three dependent variables: the creation of a truth commission to 
investigate human rights violations under Francoism (Truth Commissions), the 
organization of trials to judge those responsible for human rights violations during 
Francoism (Trials), and the withdrawal from public spaces of symbols paying tribute to 
Franco and Francoism (Symbols).  
[Figures 2-4 about here] 
These graphs indicate that, except in the first case (truth commissions), 
Spaniards are overtly supportive of TJ policies. This is interesting, as the strong 
resistance to the “Law of Historical Memory” displayed by the main right-wing party in 
Spain (Partido Popular) and the conservative mass media would lead us to expect a 
greater degree of opposition to these policies. We also observe that people are more 
prone to agreeing to symbolic reparations (withdrawal of symbols) than to the other two 
TJ measures (truth commission, trials). This is rather intuitive and consistent with 
patterns observed in other cases, e.g. the American South (Sheridan, 2009). 
Additionally, trials receive more support than truth commissions, and truth commissions 
elicit a greater number of hesitant answers than the other policies.32 
Table 1 shows the results of the first logistic regression analyses for the 
dependent variable Commissions, indicating the likelihood of supporting this particular 
reparatory measure.33 Model 0 incorporates an interaction term between Age and Size 
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of locality, which should allow us to capture the varying effect of Age conditional on 
the degree of anonymity in which individuals live. We do not include this interaction in 
the remaining models. Model 1 includes only individual factors, Models 2-3 add 
socialization and family factors, Model 4 includes an interaction between age and 
victimization, and Model 5 completes the specification with context-related variables.  
[Table 1 about here] 
Model 0 in Table 1 reveals an interesting result that confirms our expectations 
regarding the interaction between respondent’s Age and Size of locality: the main effect 
of age is negative, i.e. the older the respondent, the less likely she is to accept the 
creation of commissions. However, this main effect changes depending on whether the 
individual lives in a small town or a large city: older people in large cities are less 
reluctant to support the creation of commissions than those in small towns (regardless of 
age, the smaller the town, the more reluctant an individual will be). Again, this can be 
explained by the fear of negative reactions in smaller (and less anonymous) locations. 
This interactive effect disappears when controlling for other individual level variables, 
especially self-placement on the left-right scale and religiosity.   
Our basic expectations about individual level variables are confirmed by Model 
1. The effect of Age is again negative and statistically significant; Religiosity and 
Ideology are both negatively associated with the likelihood of accepting commissions, 
which means the more religious and more right-wing the person is, the more reluctant 
she is to support this measure. It is somewhat striking that Education and Interest in 
politics are not statistically significant. This could be due to the fact that the TJ debate, 
far from being a transversal ideology-free debate, is intensively politicized. 
Model 2 tests the impact of family-level ideology factors. It suggests that 
individuals whose families sided with the Francoists during the Civil War are 
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significantly less prone to accept commissions than other individuals. There are no 
differences in the propensity of individuals whose families were on the Republican side 
and those whose families were divided and fought on both sides. Thus, with regard to 
their family histories, individuals are significantly less likely to accept commissions if 
they come from a homogeneous Nationalist background; having had at least part of 
one’s family on the Republican side increases acceptance of this measure. The ideology 
of the respondent’s father has no impact on the dependent variable, although the sign of 
this estimate is as predicted (i.e. negative).   
An interesting result drawn from this model is that individuals are more likely to 
support the creation of commissions when the family used to talk about politics. This 
could be taken as evidence confirming the importance of socialization in the formation 
of attitudes towards TJ. Interestingly, this effect decreases after controlling for the 
victimization variables.  
Model 3 tests the family victimization hypotheses. Interestingly, victimization 
does not appear to be a homogeneous experience. Being a victim of the Francoist army 
in the Civil War has no impact on our dependent variable. However, individuals 
reporting experiences of victimization during Francoism are more likely to accept 
commissions than others; the magnitude of this effect is quite important and it is highly 
statistically significant. Therefore, more recent victimization (i.e. during the 
dictatorship) appears to be more relevant than victimization during the Civil War. This 
result is consistent with the fact that the truth commissions would focus on human rights 
violations committed under the dictatorship, and not during the Civil War.   
We have tested for the interactive hypotheses between reported victimization 
and age (model 4). Our expectation was that the impact of victimization would decrease 
among younger respondents, yet we cannot fully confirm this conjecture as this 
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interaction is not statistically significant (although it has a positive sign). Thus, 
victimization seems to be strongly transmitted to new generations: its impact, which is 
positive and highly statistically significant, does not change with the respondents’ age. 
Note also that the main effect of Age scarcely changes and remains negative in the 
victimization models; this means that, for those who report past experiences of family 
victimization, support for TJ is independent of their age.  
Finally, Model 5 indicates that Catalan respondents do not differ from those 
from other regions in their propensity to accept commissions, whereas the Basques are 
generally more likely to support this sort of reparation.  
[Table 2 about here] 
 Table 2 depicts the results for the dependent variable Trials. In this case, Model 
0 cannot fully confirm our hypothesis regarding the differential effect of age conditional 
on town size: the interaction is not statistically significant. Model 1 is fairly consistent 
with its equivalent in Table 1; it confirms the relevance of individual-level explanatory 
variables: Ideology, Religiosity, and Education (this was not statistically significant in 
Table 1). More educated people are less supportive of TJ.  
Model 2 reveals additional differences with respect to what we observed in 
Table 1: coming from a family who sided with the Republicans during the Civil War 
increases the likelihood of supporting trials. And the opposite is also true: respondents 
whose families sided with the Francoists are significantly less supportive of trials. 
Model 3 rejects a general impact of victimization on the acceptance of past perpetrators 
being brought to trial: indeed, none of the victimization variables is significant. 
However, Model 4 reveals a significant interaction between age and reported 
victimization by the Franco regime: older respondents reporting victimization are 
significantly more in favor of this measure than the rest of the sample. Older 
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respondents who report no victimization clearly reject holding trials, and younger 
people reporting victimization also oppose this measure, which indicates that 
victimization experiences lead to different attitudes towards reparatory measures 
depending on the individual’s age. In model 5, both regional dummies are statistically 
significant. Respondents in the Basque Country and Catalonia are more likely to accept 
the holding of trials than respondents in other territories, and this effect is greater in the 
former territory than in the latter.  
[Table 3 about here] 
Table 3 tests the determinants of attitudes towards symbolic reparation 
measures; the dependent variable measures approval of the withdrawal of symbols of 
Francoism. The first model (Model 0) suggests -as in Table 1- that even though older 
respondents are generally more reluctant to support this symbolic reparation, those 
living in larger urban areas are less likely to be so. Furthermore, as in Table 1, the only 
significant socio-demographic variables are -in addition to respondent’s age- Ideology 
and Religiosity. In this case, the position of the respondents appears to be heavily 
dependent on family variables (Model 2). Indeed: there is an almost linear association 
between family leanings in the civil conflict and respondent attitudes regarding this 
measure: whenever the respondent recalls a Francoist past in her family, her likelihood 
of accepting this form of symbolic reparation significantly decreases, as compared to 
those who claim to have roots on both sides. And when the individual comes from a 
family that fought on the Republican side, she is more likely to accept this reparation, as 
compared to those whose relatives were divided on both sides. Victimization (Model 3) 
is more significantly related to our dependent variable than in the previous models 
(Tables 1 and 2). Both estimates of victimization (victimization by of Francoism and 
bythe Nationalist side during the Civil War) are significant here. Interestingly, the 
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interaction between victimization and respondent’s age (Model 4) is not significant, 
implying that this effect is equally important among respondents of all ages. Our final 
model (Model 5) reconfirms the Basque and Catalan specificity; this regional effect is 
again stronger in the former region than in the latter.34  
A caveat to our empirical results is that the observed effects of victimization on 
attitudes towards TJ are an artifact of an endogenous relationship between reported 
victimization and ideology. It could be that those identified with the left are more prone 
to report past victimization experiences than those who identified with the right. A 
graphic inspection of the distribution of these two sub-samples along the ideological 
axis allows us to observe that these two subsamples have almost undistinguishable 
distributions. 
[Figure 5 about here] 
However, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test performed on the distribution along the 
ideological axis (i.e. left-right) of the sub-samples of victimized/non-victimized 
individuals suggests that these samples are significantly different, non-victims being 
located further to the right than non-victims (Table 4). This indicates that endogeneity 
cannot be completely discarded. 
[Table 4 about here] 
 Unfortunately, we do not have an instrumental variable for ‘victimization’, or an 
experimental design, which would allow for a better identification strategy. We 
nevertheless believe that the fact that we have controlled for the effect of each of these 
variables (i.e. ideology and victimization) on the other by including them in the same 
regression model should give us some degree of methodological comfort.  
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To summarize, the general patterns identified in these results above are as 
follows: respondent’s ideology and religiosity are decisive determinants of support, 
more conservative and religious people being the most reluctant towards TJ policies. 
The fact that the Catholic Church, in contrast to what happened in countries like 
Argentina, has never shown any regret for its support of Francoism (both during the 
Civil War and the dictatorship), may help to explain why, still today, religiosity is 
negatively associated with support for TJ measures. The effect of other individual-level 
variables is modest. Age is a relevant predictor of support, older respondents being less 
likely to support TJ. This variable appears to have a differential impact across town of 
residence; the effect of being older is stronger (more negative) in smaller towns, which 
tallies with the observed resistance to TJ policies in small villages (Aguilar 2008b). 
Education is only significant in one of our models although, interestingly enough, its 
coefficient has a negative sign in all models of the three tables. 
Regarding the impact of family socialization, we find that, 70 years after the 
Civil War and more than 30 years after the dictatorship, reported victimization -suffered 
by the respondent or their relatives- is crucial in explaining current attitudes towards TJ. 
This conclusion suggests that more attention should be paid to personal and family 
experiences in the formation of political views and attitudes, especially if they are 
traumatic. In South Africa, Backer (2006) has found significant differences between 
direct victims of the Apartheid and the rest of the population regarding satisfaction with 
the TRC. In Rwanda, a survey study of the ICTJ has also found that “personal 
experiences shaped respondents’ attitudes” (referred in Thoms et al. 2008: 79). 
In general, the impact of victimization is unrelated to the respondent’s age, 
which confirms the decisive importance of intergenerational transmission of views 
about traumatic events.35 The only exception to this is the significant effect of the age 
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parameter on support for trials (Table 2); one explanation could be that reparatory 
aspects of justice are more likely to be transmitted across generations than retributive 
ones. This might also be indicative that the revenge impulse tends to fade over time, 
whereas the need to see the victims properly redressed may be more easily and 
frequently maintained.  
Finally, we have found that contextual factors are relevant in explaining attitudes 
towards TJ policies. In this paper we have focused on regional-level factors, which are 
intuitively very relevant in the Spanish case, with the Catalan and Basque minorities. 36 
However, differences could also occur at other levels of aggregation. For example, 
Arjona (2009) has emphasized the importance of the municipal level for reparation 
policies in Colombia. The significance of these contextual differences will depend not 
only on the existence of different victimizing experiences, but also on a certain degree 
of collective self-awareness and mechanisms for its reproduction.  
5. Conclusions 
 Frequently starting from normative rather than empirically demonstrated 
assumptions, the TJ literature has traditionally focused on the different political 
strategies developed by political actors either to promote or to oppose institutional 
arrangements aimed either at redressing victims or at bringing perpetrators to justice. In 
doing so, there has been a tendency to disregard public opinion towards TJ policies. 
This is unfortunate, as the use of surveys gives us “a better sense of how pro- and anti-
TJ constituencies emerge” (Thoms, 2008: 47; 78). 
This paper, which has sought to explain determinants of popular attitudes 
towards TJ in contemporary Spain, represents a contribution to the specialized literature 
on the topic. We have analyzed TJ as disaggregated in different types of measures, 
which can either be complementary or alternative to each other. We have observed that 
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variation in support for TJ interventions issues from a combination of individual and 
family-level (socialization) variables. In general terms, those who are more likely to 
support these measures are people who are closer to the left, younger, and non-religious, 
but also people whose families sided with the Republicans during the Civil War and/or 
were victimized during the dictatorship. We have also identified some contextual 
(regional) differences, which make the likelihood of supporting TJ greater in those parts 
of the country where strong and differentiated ethnic or national identities prevail.  
 While the findings related to ideology, religiosity, age or town size may be 
dependent on the specificities of Spain (even though some could be relevant in other 
cases), a lesson that transcends this case is that policies that are perceived as being less 
aggressive, such as withdrawing symbols of the past (something that does not entail 
digging into the past to identify human rights violations and perpetrators), are more 
widely supported by the citizenry. In contrast, measures perceived as more risky (i.e. 
creation of truth commissions and holding of trials) are less widely supported by 
citizens. The importance of differentiating between the more moderate and the more 
radical instruments, and even attempts to create an ordered scale or a “spectrum” of TJ 
policies, has started to be considered in the literature (Payne et al., 2008; Grodsky, 
2009). In other words, TJ measures do not appear to be reducible to a single dimension; 
and, depending on their nature, different interventions are likely to generate different 
levels of popular support.  
 The results illustrate the long-term relevance of victimization and socialization 
on political identities. On the one hand, individuals do not seem to be forgetful of their 
history, i.e. the mere passage of time does not necessarily contribute to oblivion. In 
Spain, the lack of appropriate TJ measures may have prevented victims and their 
relatives from leaving the past behind. On the other hand, the condition of victim, which 
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may be more or less specific (i.e. relating to the family or the political community), 
seems to travel from one generation to another and to have clear-cut political 
consequences. Interestingly, Carmil and Breznitz (1990) reached a similar conclusion in 
their research on the effect of the trauma derived from the Holocaust experience on both 
the survivors and their descendants. Indeed, even if in this paper we have focused on 
attitudes towards TJ policies, the effects of victimizing experiences are likely to be 
broader (e.g. on political identities) (Balcells, 2007; Wood, 2008).  
To conclude, our work underscores the importance of micro-level data for the 
study of TJ, which can reveal unpredicted empirical patterns. For example, at the mere 
descriptive level, our study has clarified the views of Spaniards regarding TJ issues. Our 
data demonstrate that, contrary to what has been commonly assumed, Spaniards are 
reasonably supportive of the application of TJ policies.37 In fact, the data indicates that 
the average Spanish citizen would have endorsed a more ambitious legal application of 
TJ principles than that provided for in the 2007 “Law of Historical Memory”.    
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Logit Regressions: Creation of a truth commission for investigating 
human rights violations under Francoism 
 
Commissions   M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
Age effect Age  -0.023*** -0.008** -0.006 -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 Town size -0.144* -0.022 -0.025 -0.027 -0.027 -0.024 
  (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
 Town size*age 0.003*      
  (0.00)      
Individual 
level 
Interest in politics   0.013 -0.027 -0.053 -0.052 -0.052 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
 Education  -0.110 -0.112 -0.127 -0.126 -0.132 
   (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
 Religiosity  -0.175*** -0.151*** -0.130*** -0.129*** -0.133*** 
   (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
 Ideology    -0.340*** -0.287*** -0.288*** -0.288*** -0.286*** 
   (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Socialization 
(1) 
Family on Francoist side in 
Civil War 
  -0.382** 
(0.15) 
-0.268* 
(0.16) 
-0.266* 
(0.16) 
-0.264* 
(0.16) 
 Family on Republican side in 
CW 
  0.075 0.005 0.003 -0.001 
   (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
 Family talked about politics   0.201*** 0.140*** 0.139** 0.137* 
   (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
 Father’s ideology    -0.026 -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 
    (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
 Victim of Francoism     0.839*** 0.700* 0.831*** 
     (0.13) (0.36) (0.13) 
 Victim of Francoists in the 
CW 
   0.029 
(0.13) 
0.030 
(0.13) 
0.034 
(0.13) 
 Age*victimization      0.003  
      (0.01)  
Regional 
differences 
(2) 
Catalonia       -0.017 
      (0.14) 
Basque country      0.451* 
      (0.27) 
Constant   1.200 2.679 2.160 2.331 2.360*** 2.326*** 
  (0.35) (0.34) (0.37) (0.38) (0.39) (0.38) 
N  1704 1704 1704 1704 1704 1704 
Chi2  20.33*** 208.84*** 229.89*** 275.177*** 275.349*** 278.20*** 
Akaike’s IC  2346.117 2163.602 2150.561 2109.274 2111.102 2110.250 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
(1) The reference category comprises those who said their family fought on both sides during the Civil War. 
(2) The reference category comprises all other Spaniards.  
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Table 2. Ordinal Logit Regressions: The authorities that violated human rights 
under Francoism should be brought to trial 
 
Trials   M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
Age effect Age  -0.028*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.021*** -0.017*** 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 Town size -0.092 0.030 0.029 0.029 0.027 0.030 
  (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
 Town size*age 0.003      
  (0.00)      
Individual level Interest in politics   -0.007 -0.011 -0.013 -0.007 -0.008 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Education  -0.144* -0.125 -0.127 -0.122 -0.137 
   (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
 Religiosity  -0.127*** -0.101** -0.100*** -0.093** -0.090** 
   (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
 Ideology   -0.325*** -0.264*** -0.263*** -0.260*** -0.251*** 
   (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Socialization (1) Family on Francoist side in 
Civil War 
  -0.249* -0.243* -0.230 -0.252* 
   (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
 Family on Republican side 
in CW 
  0.363*** 0.357*** 0.343*** 0.297*** 
   (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
 Family talked about politics   0.025 0.021 0.014 0.011 
    (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
 Father’s ideology    -0.015 -0.014 -0.014 -0.016 
    (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
 Victim of Francoism     0.045 -0.732** 0.073 
     (0.12) (0.33) (0.12) 
 Victim of Francoists in  CW    0.012 0.027 0.002 
    (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
 Age*victimization      0.017**  
      (0.01)  
Regional  Catalonia       0.558*** 
differences (2)       (0.15) 
 Basque country      0.969*** 
       (0.28) 
Cut point 1   -1.981 -3.540 -3.146 -3.149 -3.343 -3.061 
  (0.35) (0.33) (0.36) (0.36) (0.37) (0.36) 
Cut point 2  -1.518 -3.032 -2.632 -2.636 -2.828 -2.540 
  (0.35) (0.33) (0.36) (0.36) (0.37) (0.36) 
N  1737 1737 1737 1737 1737 1737 
Chi2   44.42*** 215.54*** 233.94*** 234.12*** 240.65*** 259.918*** 
Akaike’s IC  3129.685 2964.560 2954.169 2957.987 2953.453 2936.186 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
(1) The reference category comprises those who said their family fought on both sides during the Civil War. 
(2) The reference category comprises all other Spaniards.  
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Table 3. Ordinal Logit Regressions: Symbols paying tribute to Francoism should 
be withdrawn from public spaces 
 
Symbols   M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
Age effect Age  -0.032*** 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 Town size -0.284*** -0.023 -0.023 -0.025 -0.026 -0.024 
  (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
 Town size*age 0.006***      
  (0.00)      
Individual level Interest in politics   0.089 0.103 0.089 0.091 0.093 
  (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
 Education  -0.031 -0.014 -0.032 -0.031 -0.044 
   (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
 Religiosity  -0.250*** -0.220*** -0.209*** -0.208*** -0.203*** 
   (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
 Ideology   -0.436*** -0.387*** -0.383*** -0.382*** -0.374*** 
   (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Socialization 
(1) 
Family in Francoist side in  
the Civil War 
  -0.449*** -0.384*** -0.377** -0.386*** 
  (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) 
Family in Republican side 
in the Civil War 
  0.271** 0.183 0.178 0.121 
   (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
 Family talked about politics   -0.007 -0.042 -0.044 -0.050 
    (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
 Father’s ideology    0.016 0.019 0.020 0.020 
    (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
 Victim of Francoism     0.366*** 0.107 0.384*** 
     (0.13) (0.36) (0.14) 
 Victim of Francoists in the 
Civil War 
   0.248* 0.253* 0.234* 
    (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
 Age*victimization      0.006  
      (0.01)  
Regional 
differences (2) 
(ref. is other) 
Catalonia       0.456*** 
(0.16) 
 Basque country      1.464*** 
       (0.36) 
Cut point 1   -2.666*** -3.803*** -3.365*** -3.410*** -3.463*** -3.347*** 
  (0.35) (0.35) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) 
Cut point 2  -2.171*** -3.217*** -2.773*** -2.815*** -2.867*** -2.743*** 
  (0.35) (0.34) (0.37) (0.37) (0.38) (0.38) 
N  1807 1807 1807 1807 1807 1807 
Chi2  24.772*** 333.980*** 351.872*** 366.238*** 366.817*** 395.031*** 
Akaike’s IC  3082.796 2779.588 2769.696 2759.330 2760.750 2734.537 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
(1) The reference category comprises those who said their family fought on both sides during the Civil War. 
(2) The reference category comprises all other Spaniards.  
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Table 4. Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
Smaller group D P.value 
Non-victims 0 1.00 
Victims -0.12 0.00 
Combined K-S 0.12 0.00 
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Figure 1. Determinants of TJ policies 
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Figure 2. Support for the creation of a truth commission to investigate human 
rights violations under Francoism 
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Figure 3- Support for trials against authorities that violated human rights under 
Francoism 
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Figure 4. Support for the withdrawal of monuments paying tribute to Francoism 
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Figure 5. Ideology self-placement for victims and non-victims 
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Appendix 
Descriptive statistics  
Variable name N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Trials 2,525 2.36 0.87 1 3 
Symbols 2,667 2.49 0.81 1 3 
Monuments  2,617 2.50 0.80 1 3 
Commissions 2,426 0.52 0.49 0 1 
Age 2,936 47.17 18.15 18 99 
Town size 2,936 3.87 1.65 1 7 
Interest in politics 2,919 2.08 0.88 1 4 
Education 2,929 1.91 0.70 1 3 
Religiosity 2,868 2.50 1.35 1 6 
Ideology 2,435 4.39 1.74 1 10 
Victim of Francoism 2,936 0.24 0.42 0 1 
Victim of Francoists in CW 2,936 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Family on Francoist side in CW  2,936 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Family on Republican side in CW 2,936 0.32 0.46 0 1 
Family talked about politics 2,854 1.91 0.82 1 4 
Father’s ideology 2,103 4.82 2.21 1 10 
Catalonia  2,936 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Basque country 2,936 0.23 0.42 0 1 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  39
                                                            
Endnotes 
 
1  The first category includes: trials; annulment of auto-amnesties approved by 
officials of the previous regime; legislation expropriating illegitimately acquired assets 
of former authoritarian parties; lustration or purging of individuals actively involved 
with the authoritarian regime. Reparation ranges from various forms of material 
compensatory policies (e.g. restitution of confiscated property rights, or provision of 
pensions to the victims or their families) to symbolic measures (e.g. memorials to the 
victims, or official apologies). Truth revelation procedures normally entail the creation 
of commissions and/or the declassification of secret police archives. 
2  See, among others, Kritz (1995); McAdams (1997); Teitel (2000); Barahona de 
Brito et al. (2001); Elster (1998; 2004; 2006); Nalepa (2008; 2010); De Greiff (not 
dated). 
3  While the latter caveat applies to any policy, it is particularly relevant in the case 
of TJ for a number of reasons: firstly, civil society is likely to be weakened in the 
aftermath of an authoritarian experience and/or a violent conflict, and organizational 
resources to lobby for TJ are likely to be scarce. Secondly, even if there is an underlying 
desire for these type of measures in society, people are not likely to openly request them 
for fear of political destabilization, residual power of the repressive actors, and the like. 
Finally, pressures exerted by a number of social actors aimed at advancing TJ may 
simply be representative of a few groups with highly intense preferences (i.e. victims 
and their relatives), and not of the society in general. 
4  A notable exception is Gibson’s (2002; 2004a; 2004b) research in South Africa. 
Through representative surveys at national level, his research has focused on the 
reconciliatory effects of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), as well as on 
the social perception of justice derived from this institution. Nalepa (2008; 2010) has 
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also implemented representative surveys in Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic on 
matters related to TJ policies. Other studies based on survey research are listed in 
Thoms et. al. (2008: 78-85). 
5  The estimated death toll during the Civil War is 800,000, of which around 
122,000 are estimated to be civilian victims of intentional lethal violence –of these, 
84,095 were victims of Francoist violence, and 37,843 were victims of Leftist violence 
(Juliá 2004). 
6  Aguilar (2008a) argues that a crucial factor explaining the resurgence of this 
debate is the arrival in the public sphere of the “grandchildren of the war”, who were 
free from the fears and guilt of their parents. Davis (2005: 868) has pointed to the 
importance of Pinochet’s arrest in London -after an initiative by the Spanish judge 
Baltasar Garzón- in understanding these changes. 
7  Official State Gazette nº 310, of 27th December 2007, p.53410. It will be 
referred to in this article as the “Law of Historical Memory”, the name it has been given 
in the mass media.  
8  See, for example, Nalepa (2007) for Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary; 
David and Choi (2006) for the Czech Republic; Theidon (2006) for Peru; Gibson (2002, 
2004a, 2004b, 2007) for South Africa; Biro et al. (2004) for Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Croatia. 
9   The effect of the perceived threat from members linked to the authoritarian 
regime is studied by Nalepa (2007), who finds it to be a significant predictor of attitudes 
towards lustration in Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary. This factor was also found 
to be significant in South Africa (Gibson, 2004b). 
10  On trauma and fear arising from repression in authoritarian regimes, see 
Koonings and Kruijt (1999). 
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11  In Spain, leftist ideology would be expected to be associated with support for TJ 
policies. The opposite would apply in other contexts (i.e. post-Communist settings).  
12   Nonetheless, we will empirically explore a different set of interactions.  
13  The Basque Country and Catalonia are over-represented, with 699 and 683 
respondents, respectively. In our analyses, we take into account this over-representation 
so that the results are perfectly representative of the whole country.  
14   The response options are 1 = Yes; 2 = No; 3 = Doesn’t Know; 4 = Doesn’t 
Answer; we built a dummy variable with values 1 = Yes; 0 = No. 
15   Responses are measured on a scale from 1 to 3 where 1 = “Completely 
disagree”; 3 = “Completely agree”; 2 = “Neither agree nor disagree.” 
16   The same scale as in 2 applies. 
17   Town size is entered as an ordinal variable (on a scale 1-7) following the usual 
coding in CIS surveys. The categories are: 1 = 2,000 or fewer inhabitants; 2 = between 
2,001 and 10,000; 3 = between 10,001 and 50,000; 4 = between 50,001 and 100,000; 5 
= between 100,001 and 400,000; 6 = between 400,001 and 1,000,000; 7 = more than 
1,000,000. 
18   “Could you tell me if you are interested in politics in general?” Possible 
responses are 4 = Very much; 3 = Quite a lot; 2 = A little; 1 = Not at all. 
19   Indeed, education and interest in politics are two mandatory controls in our 
estimation, since individuals scoring higher in one or both are much less likely to give a 
“does not know” type of answer. Adding these controls helps to avoid sample bias.  
20   The variable has the values 1 for primary education or less; 2 for secondary 
education; 3 for university degree. 
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21   This is a scalar variable that goes from 1 to 6, where 1 is non-religious (i.e. the 
respondent identifies herself as atheist or non-religious) and 6 highly religious (i.e. the 
respondent says that she goes to mass several days a week). 
22   While the impact of religion on Spanish politics is not as strong as it used to be, 
it remains a significant factor explaining voting and electoral competition (Montero et 
al., 2008). 
23   This variable measures the self-reported position on the left-right scale ranging 
from 1 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). 
24   We measure this with the question: “As far as you can remember, which of the 
two sides that fought the Civil War did your family most identify with, the Republicans 
or the Nationalists?” [“Nationalists” is the name that was given to Franco’s supporters 
during the Civil War]. Possible responses are: 1 = Nationalist; 2 = Republicans; 3 = 
Both; 4 = Neither. This question has been used in previous surveys conducted by the 
CIS. In our survey, the response rate to this question (77%) was higher than in any 
previous one. We include this variable in the regressions as two different dummies: 
Family Nationalist Side, and Family Republican Side. 
25  “When you were a child or adolescent, how much did they talk about politics at 
home?”: 4 = Very much; 3 = Quite a lot; 2 = A little; 1 = Not at all. 
26  To be consistent with the traditional male preeminence in Spanish culture we 
use father’s position on the ideological scale. The correlation between the father’s 
ideology and the mother’s is very high (0.77), so we cannot include both of them in the 
same regressions. Using the mother’s ideology implies no change in our results (these 
are available upon request). Since our indicator was reported by the respondent, some 
bias may exist (i.e. the respondent bringing her father closer to her ideological 
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positions). Yet, the correlation between the respondent’s ideology and her father’s is not 
dramatically high (0.55). 
27  We do not take into account victimization by the Republican side during the 
Civil War, as we would not expect this to have straightforward effects on attitudes 
towards TJ. As we explained, victims of the Republican side received reparations in the 
past. Current TJ measures are connected to reparation for Francoist violations.  
28  Victimization includes any of the following: death in combat; death in 
bombardment; homicide; death penalty; disappearance; imprisonment; flight from 
Spain; was forced into hiding; was expelled from work. We label this variable “Victim 
of Nationalist Side during CW”. 
29  This includes any of the following: arrest; imprisonment; was expelled from 
work; was fined; was forced to leave the country; was executed. We label this variable 
“Victim of Francoism”. 
30  Due to the limited number of cases in the group of people with direct 
victimizing experiences, we include family and individual victimization experiences 
together. We have also run analyses without those with personal victimizing 
experiences, and the results are consistent. 
31   According to Thoms et al. (2008: 81),”different regions (…) are likely to have 
quite different views on TJ”, and they recommend “over-sampling”, as we have done in 
our study. 
32   The rate of “doesn’t know” responses is 16.12% for truth commissions, 14.7% 
for trials, and 9.91% for symbols. We must bear in mind that the question about the 
creation of a truth commission had a different set of response categories than the others; 
in this case, the intermediate category of “indifferent” is absent, which may have pushed 
the respondents toward either one of the two extremes: agree-disagree. 
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33  Note that missing data implies a reduction in the size of the sample used for the 
estimations of models presented in tables 1, 2, and 3. Re-estimating them using 
selection models that correct for potential selection bias in our dependent variables 
implies no changes to our conclusions. 
34   Though we do not have enough space to develop on the differences between 
Basques and Catalans regarding their support of TJ policies, one explanation could be 
that Basque nationalism is more extreme than Catalan. While in the Basque Country 
there is a significant tendency to consider Spanish and Basque identities as 
incompatible, in Catalonia dual identities (people feeling simultaneously Spanish and 
Catalan) are more frequent (this can be seen in our survey: available upon request). 
Given that Francoism was characterized by the aggressive imposition of Spanish 
identity and the repression of minority identities, a more extreme ethnic identity may be 
leaning towards a greater support for TJ measures.  
35  Similarly, in the South African case it has been confirmed that “young blacks 
are not more likely to be reconciled than older blacks” (Gibson, 2004b: 215). 
36  This result ties in with Gibson’s (2004a) finding regarding the importance of 
racial identities in explaining the acceptance of TJ measures in South Africa. 
37   In most of the few existing studies based on survey data, support for TJ 
measures shows to be more common than the opposite (Thoms et al, 2008: 78). 
